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Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) are a considerable presenting problem in
general practice. Alexithymia and difficulties with mental elaboration of bodily arousal are
hypothesized as a key mechanism in MUS. In turn, this inability influences the embodied
being and participating of these patients in the world, which is coined as ‘the lived
body’ and underlies what is mostly referred to as body awareness (BA). The present
article explores a more innovative hypothesis how hands-on bodywork can influence
BA and serve as a rationale for a body integrated psychotherapeutic approach of MUS.
Research not only shows that BA is a bottom-up ‘bodily’ affair but is anchored in a
interoceptive-insular pathway (IIP) which in turn is deeply connected with autonomic
and emotional brain areas as well as verbal and non-verbal memory. Moreover, it
is emphasized how skin and myofascial tissues should be seen as an interoceptive
generator, if approached in the proper manual way. This article offers supportive
evidence explaining why a ‘haptic’ touch activates this IIP, restores the myofascial
armored body, helps patients rebalancing their window of tolerance and facilitates BA
by contacting their bodily inner-world. From a trans-disciplinary angle this article reflects
on how the integration of bodywork with non-directive verbal guidance can be deeply
healing and resourcing for the lived body experience in MUS. In particular for alexithymic
patients this approach can be of significance regarding their representational failure of
bodily arousal.
Keywords: medically unexplained symptoms, alexithymia, touch, interoception, body awareness, psychotherapy,
bodywork, phenomenology
INTRODUCTION
Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) are estimated to be the presenting problem for 35% up
to 64% of new patients in general practice (Jackson and Passamonti, 2005; Steinbrecher et al.,
2011) and for 37–66% of new outpatients at specialist medical clinics (Nimnuan et al., 2001).
The term MUS has received a lot of criticism, yet, recent diagnostic ‘improvements’ such as
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‘functional somatic syndromes’ or ‘somatic symptom disorder’
in DSM-V still fail to oﬀer a better etiological understanding
and framework for therapy. This is especially the case for
DSM-V (Frances, 2014; Vanheule, 2014; Vanheule et al.,
2014). Therapeutic tools are not really based on a sound
pathophysiological understanding and both pharmacological
and non-pharmacological treatment outcomes are often
disappointing (Kleinstäuber et al., 2014; Van Dessel et al.,
2014).
On the other hand there is an increasing amount of research
that shows the importance of personal history, attachment, and
trauma (Van der Kolk, 1994, 2014; Taylor et al., 2000; Wearden
et al., 2005; Buﬃngton, 2009) where aﬀect regulation seems to
be a key element in understanding MUS (Waller and Scheidt,
2006). It even oﬀers concrete implications for therapy since the
ability to regulate negative or positive inner arousal seems to be
diﬃcult or even absent in patients with MUS, whether or not
related to trauma (Kooiman et al., 2000, 2004; Van der Kolk,
2005, 2009; Grabe et al., 2008; Huber et al., 2009; Bogaerts et al.,
2010). From a psychiatric and psychological point of view this
inability is conceptualized as a personality trait called alexithymia
(Sifneos, 1973; Bermond et al., 2006). Numerous studies have
identiﬁed alexithymia and the absence of mental elaboration of
bodily arousal as a keymechanism in the etiology or maintenance
of MUS such as chronic fatigue syndrome, ﬁbromyalgia, non-
cardiac chest pain, irritable bowel syndrome, and to some extent
panic attacks as well as medical and psychiatric disorders (De
Gucht and Heiser, 2003; De Gucht et al., 2004; Herbert et al.,
2011; Vanheule et al., 2011a,b; Meganck et al., 2013). To some
extent alexithymia can be seen as the opposite of mentalization
which refers to the ability to explore and express one’s own
bodily sensations and feelings, as well as the emotional presence
and intentions of others. Mentalization-based treatments have
proven to be eﬃcient for diﬀerent populations of patients with
psychosomatic or psychiatric problems. However, a large group
of patients with MUS keeps presenting in therapy, making no
progress and leaving the therapist frustrated looking for novel or
alternative tools.
This present article will try to clarify in a trans-disciplinary
way how an integrated psychotherapeutic approach of hands-on
bodywork and body awareness (BA) may be an interesting and
refreshing approach for these hard-to-treat patients. Although
this kind of integration is distinctive for what is mostly
referred to as body (oriented) psychotherapy, body mind
therapy or somatic psychotherapy, it is often overlooked or
neglected in mainstream psychotherapy (Totton, 2005; Heller,
2012; Cipolletta, 2013; Cornell, 2015; Geuter, 2015). To avoid
conceptual misunderstanding or school-dependent vocabulary,
this article will use ‘experiential bodywork’ (EBW) as an umbrella
term for those body mind therapies using an explicit hands-on
approach, often in combination with movement-based strategies
for emotional awareness and expression. So in EBW the therapist
works with BA and touch to bring patients in contact with their
inner world and to facilitate interpersonal dynamics. Being a
touch-based experiential approach, EBW incorporates hands-on
techniques to work speciﬁcally on the patients’ body, which will
be detailed in this article as the myofascial system. Basically EBW
is a phenomenological approach, focussing on the lived body
experience of the patient. Although BA therapies in general are
often lacking solid scientiﬁc evidence (Courtois et al., 2015), a
compelling body of research shows how being aware of your body
is essential in normal development and health outcomes (Fuchs,
2001; Gard, 2005; Osborn and Smith, 2006; Bullington, 2009;
Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009; Payne, 2009; Zeiler, 2010; Fogel, 2011;
Cipolletta et al., 2014). Especially the hands-on feature of EBW is
hypothesized to be a powerful aspect of the therapeutic process
but is –however– not researched well enough in relation to MUS.
The hypothesis explored in this article is that integrating
bodywork in psychotherapy is a useful strategy for MUS,
speciﬁcally in relation to alexithymia. Moreover, a touch-based
‘myofascial’ entry point can have an added value on BA as
a therapeutic outcome and on the lived body experience in
general. To support this hypothesis, the role of interoception
in relation to BA, aﬀect regulation and psychosomatics will
need to be discussed. So after ﬁrstly situating how MUS
and alexithymia are related to BA processing, this article will
secondly elaborate in detail on the signiﬁcance and speciﬁcity
of interoceptive brain-pathways to BA. Finally this will lead
to possible underpinnings for a more innovative hypothesis in
which we explore how myofascial tissue dynamics, as related to
hands-on bodywork, inﬂuence BA-processing and how this can
serve as a plausible rationale for a body integrated therapeutic
approach of MUS.
PART I: ALEXITHYMIA, MUS AND BA
PROCESSING
In their review, Rief and Broadbent (2007) describe how diﬀerent
etiological models for MUS have developed over the last two
decades. Most of these models point at the maintaining or causal
inﬂuence of cognitive factors such as symptom attribution, illness
belief, attention, perception, and memory bias. Besides these
elements, the importance of attachment style and personality
factors, especially those traits that are involved in emotional
regulation, are stressed. The concept of alexithymia as the
inability to explore one’s inner world is often used to understand
how MUS can develop. Since Sifneos (1973) introduced the
concept of alexithymia there has been an exponential interest
in its relationship with psychopathology although a unanimous
explanation is lacking. Nevertheless alexithymia seems to be one
of the important underpinnings in understanding how stress-
inducing factors in one’s personal life can lead to MUS or
somatization in general (De Gucht and Heiser, 2003).
Leaving the mere symptomatic level and trying to grasp
the more etiological dynamics of MUS empirical research has
shown that what is called somatization should be divided in
two categories, i.e., presenting and functional somatization (De
Gucht and Heiser, 2003; De Gucht et al., 2004). ‘Presenting’
somatization is considered as secondary to psycho-emotional
distress where in functional somatization, the somatization itself
is seen as a primary phenomenon, typically characterized by
unexplainable symptoms. In the latter somatization can be
understood as a somatic equivalent of an anxiety disorder or
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depression whereby the personality trait alexithymia could be
a signiﬁcant factor in the appearance of the unexplainable
symptoms (Verhaeghe and Vanheule, 2005). So in functional
somatization, the bodily distress comes instead of the mental
phenomenon of anxiety because the patient is unable to explore
his arousal and to elaborate on it mentally using language,
metaphors, or phantasies.
This explanation is in line with numerous observations in
trauma patients who are unable to connect the traumatic event
with a suitable narrative to explain what they went through,
which in fact seems crucial for recovery: “Only when they
(traumatic memories) have been fully assimilated and assigned
to the hippocampal timeline can they become integrated and
experienced as ‘just a memory’ in the past” (Payne et al., 2015).
Research also strongly stresses the bottom-up mortgage that
trauma poses on normal processing of intense emotions and
shows how dysfunctional bodily processes involving breathing,
dystonia, immunology, and digestion are involved (Guilbaud
et al., 2003; Levine, 2005; Ogden et al., 2006; Siegel, 2009;
Van der Kolk, 2014). In particular the role of the autonomic
nervous system has led to several models of psychosomatic
dysfunction or trauma related disorder such as the visceral brain-
body transfer (Cameron, 2009), the polyvagal theory (Porges,
2009), the neurovisceral integration (Thayer and Brosschot, 2005;
Cameron, 2009), the window of tolerance (Ogden et al., 2006)
or more recently the preparatory set (Payne and Crane-Godreau,
2015). In essence all these models point at the signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of a deeply disturbed autonomic nervous system with
severe consequences for all aﬀerent and eﬀerent processing. In
this regard, especially interoception is essential and seems to be a
key element in what leads to body- and self-awareness (Cameron,
2001, 2009; Craig, 2003, 2011), which in turn is the quintessence
of EBW.
PART II: BRAIN PATHWAYS OF BODY
AWARENESS AND INTEROCEPTION
In phenomenology an individual is conceived as the perspectival
origin of his experiences, behavior, and thoughts and seen as
the center of self-awareness, object-experience and meaning
bestowing (Stanghellini, 2009). This embodied presence in the
world is coined as ‘the lived body’ and underlies what is mostly
referred to as BA. The lived body is seen as the phenomenological
fundament of being-in-the-world and serves at the same time as
the key entry point to the self and the world: we literally stand
out [latin: existere] in our world and so we exist. Gyllensten
et al. (2010) describe the concept of the embodied identity as
related to living in the body and living in relation to others and
society. Here, BA ﬁts in embodied identity: being aware of my
bodily being in the world grounds my experience of who I am
as an embodied identity. So my identity is not just a conceptual
understanding ofmy self, it is always and foremost a bodily being-
related-to and a being-embedded-in the world, as Merleau–
Ponty has grounded the concept of embodiment (Carman,
2008). In relation to embodiment, BA is the awareness of
embodiment as an innate tendency of our organism for emergent
self-organization and wholeness (Mehling et al., 2011). Fogel
(2009) describes BA as the ability to pay attention to ourselves,
to feel our sensations, and movements online, along with the
motivational and emotional feelings that accompany them, in the
present moment, without the mediating inﬂuence of judgmental
thoughts. Mehling et al. (2011) sees BA as the subjective,
phenomenological aspect of proprioception and interoception
that enters conscious awareness and is modiﬁable by mental
processes including attention, interpretation, appraisal, beliefs,
memories, conditioning attitude, and aﬀect. In that way
interoception is central to BA, next to body scheme, existing of
exteroception and proprioception. Besides typical examples of
interoceptive sensations like cold, itch, tickle or visceral urgency,
also tensed muscles or muscle tone are processed interoceptively
(Fogel, 2009).
Since Craig (2009) coined interoception as information
coming from all over the body diﬀerent authors propose
interoception as the neuroanatomical pathway leading to the
emergence of BA (Vaitl, 1996; Critchley et al., 2004; Walusinski,
2006). Interoception is triggered when changes occur in
homeostasis, registered by diﬀerent kinds of receptors in, e.g.,
skin, joints, muscles, internal organs, and is supported by
two main tracts, the parasympathetic and the sympathetic
aﬀerents (Vaitl, 1996). An important characteristic of the
ascending aﬀerent sympathetic route is its connection with
the parasympathetic route (Walusinski, 2006). This link allows
integrated maps of our bodily conditions being generated
(Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). The sympathetic aﬀerents, on
the one hand, make a monosynaptic connection onto lamina I,
whereas the ﬁbers from the parasympathetic pathway project to
the nucleus of the solitary tract (Craig, 2003), which integrates
general information on arousal, sexuality, and nourishment
(Walusinski, 2006).
In primates, lamina I output neurons have three diﬀerent
projections sites: the spinal autonomic nuclei, the parabrachial
nuclei together with the periaqueductal gray and hypothalamic
portion and ﬁnally there is the cortical higher-order posterior
part of the ventromedial nucleus of the thalamus, situated in the
forebrain (Craig, 2002, 2009). The complementary parabrachial
nuclei and the periaqueductal gray are the most important
integrators on brain stem level for all the homeostatic aﬀerent
information necessary for survival (Craig, 2003). The output
neurons of the nucleus of the solitary tract solely have two
diﬀerent projection sites, located in the same regions as the
sympathetic aﬀerent route: the parabrachial nuclei and the
ventromedial nucleus of the thalamus. Only in primates this
aﬀerent information can bypass the brainstem directly via a
pathway directly going from lamina I and the nucleus of the
solitary tract to the thalamus. The other route, where aﬀerent
homeostatic information is ﬁrst conducted to the parabrachial
nuclei in the brainstem before arriving at the thalamus, is
found in sub-primates. In turn, the thalamic nucleus projects
all interoceptive aﬀerent information, coming from the body,
on the posterior insula. This brain-pathway diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from the somatosensory cortices that receive exteroceptive input,
explaining the distinct neuroanatomical basis of interoception
and exteroception (Craig, 2002).
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The Role of the Insula in Body
Awareness
As shown in Figure 1, a progressive integration of the aﬀerent
information via a posterior-to-anterior sequence takes place in
the insula (Craig, 2009; Simmons et al., 2013). So the aﬀerent
information emerging from the body ﬁnds its way from the
posterior, over the mid, to the anterior insula. This running
from the posterior insula, where a ﬁrst-order representation
is mapping the physiological condition of the body as an
‘interoceptive image,’ leaves the mid insula as an important
integrative zone on the cortical level (Craig, 2010, 2011). From
the mid-insula, all information goes to the left or right anterior
insula, where a motivational, social, cognitive, and hedonic
dimension is added and an ultimate re-representation or meta-
image is made (Craig, 2009; Berlucchi and Aglioti, 2010; Herbert
and Pollatos, 2012). Craig (2004, 2011) states that the right non-
dominant anterior insular cortex is the most important structure
in detecting our inner feelings.
Diﬀerent authors also suggest a lateralization in the
hemispheres, based on the type of stimulus that is presented
(Cameron and Minoshima, 2002; Pollatos et al., 2007; Craig,
2009). This determines whether the re-representation will
occur in the right insula (when a sympathetic, negative, or
energy expenditure stimulus is presented) or left anterior
insula (when a parasympathetic, positive, or energy-nourishing
stimulus is presented (Craig, 2009, 2011). In relation to
MUS, a disharmonious and prolonged activation of the
sympathetic over the parasympathetic seems to be associated
with disinhibited defensive circuits that in turn can be pathogenic
for psychosomatic dysfunctioning (Thayer and Brosschot, 2005).
When aﬀerent information becomesmore complex during the
posterior-to-anterior gradient in the insula, the posterior insula –
suggested to have an important role in triggering the pain matrix
network (Porges, 2009; Isnard et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2013)–
produces a ﬁrst-order, objective, non-contextual representation,
while the anterior insula is related to more subjective feelings.
Craig (2009) notes that this process only takes place when
attention is focused on the presented stimulus as explicated
in the deﬁnition of BA. In this way, interoception can be
modulated by changing attention, emotions, or mood (Bushnell
et al., 2013; Häfner, 2013). More speciﬁc, the right anterior
insula is seen by Craig (2009) as the sole structure that creates
subjective feelings, resulting from the body, into awareness
through a second order re-representation and which makes
it the neural substrate for body and self-awareness (Tsakiris
et al., 2007; Khalsa et al., 2008, 2009; Berlucchi and Aglioti,
2010; Tsakiris, 2010). This ﬁnding of the right anterior insula
as dominant for interoception is supported by diﬀerent studies
(Critchley et al., 2004; Pollatos et al., 2005, 2007; Walusinski,
2006; Critchley and Seth, 2012; Herbert and Pollatos, 2012;
Seth, 2013). Further, the anterior insula is inﬂuenced by top-
down predictions from high level cortical areas such as the
anterior cingulate cortex or the prefrontal cortex and in turn,
provides descending interoceptive predictions to eﬀerent systems
that guide information for autonomic reﬂexes (Gu et al., 2013;
Seth, 2013). Up to this point of the anterior insula, it can be
concluded that this interoceptive-insular pathway provides the
neural correlate for BA.
The Interoceptive Pathway and the
Limbic System
Subsequently, the interoceptive-insular pathway proceeds from
the anterior insula to the closely linked emotional activating brain
sites: the anterior cingulate cortex, hypothalamus, amygdala, and
the orbitofrontal cortex that adds a hedonic-aﬀective loading to
the felt sensation of the body (Craig, 2003; Bechara and Naqvi,
2004). The anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula serve
together as two complementary limbic regions in virtually all
emotions (the latter can be seen as the limbic sensory cortex
and the ﬁrst as the limbic motor counterpart). This anterior
cingulate cortex provides feelings arising from the body with a
motivational element, while the insula adds an emotional element
(Craig, 2002). The latter moderates feelings and awareness and
the ﬁrst does the same for motivations and behaviors (Craig,
2011). The orbitofrontal cortex and the right anterior insula are
the only brain regions where the size of brain area has a direct
association with interoceptive awareness which might suggest
strong evidence for these structures to play a role in interoception
(Craig, 2004).
So in origin also emotions are formed via this interoceptive-
insular pathway, based on arousal emerging from the body
that supports homeostasis. This is adherent to the James–Lange
theory of emotions that states that a frightening stimulus leads
to physical reactions (e.g., sweating, heart pounding), leading
FIGURE 1 | Posterior-to-anterior gradient of awareness proposed by Craig (2009).
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eventually to an emotion (fear) which is the result of the
interpretation of these bodily states and not of a cognitive top-
down analysis of the frightening stimulus. The interoceptive-
insular pathway also supports the ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis
of Damasio (2003) suggesting that higher-order decision-making
relies strongly on bodily interoceptive input. The description of
the interoceptive BA-pathway by Craig is similar to Cameron
(2001) and Walusinski (2006), but Cameron states that a third
major pathway –i.e., the enteric nervous system– has to be
distinguished and adds that the sympathetic aﬀerent ﬁbers
also project on lamina’s V, VII, and VIII. Also Damasio’s
(2003) vision is highly congruent with Craig’s, but there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Although Damasio (2003) describes the
sympathetic and parasympathetic route in a similar way, he
puts more emphasis on the hypothalamus, which is regarded
as the homeostatic motor center of the diencephalon, and the
periaqueductal gray, viewed as the homeostatic motor center of
the mesencephalon (Craig, 2003). Following Damasio (2003), the
ability to experience feelings is also derived from the brainstem
and probably from the somatosensory cortices so he concludes
that a more modular role –instead of a generative one– should be
attributed to the insula.
PART III: INTEGRATING BODY
AWARENESS FROM A MYOFASCIAL
PERSPECTIVE IN EXPERIENTIAL
BODYWORK
As one could wonder why a detailed analysis of the diﬀerent
views on BA-pathways is necessary for the aim of this article,
some reﬂections have to be taken into account. First of all, a
profound insight in the interoceptive underpinnings of BA is a
requisite for understanding which structures –from peripheral
receptors to central brain areas– are involved in the gradual
process of becoming aware of ones bodily self. Although there
seems to be some dissonance on the degree of involvement –
especially the insula as the sole integrator and generator of BA–
there is fair agreement on the common ground in BA-pathways.
Literally all bodily tissues and regions are to some extent tuning
into the interoceptive-insular pathway via a parasympathetic,
sympathetic, or enteric route. In this hierarchical bottom-up
processing there seems to be a signiﬁcant role of the insular
level regarding the emergence of BA and its embedding in the
limbic emotional network. Secondly, it is important to know
that besides this interoceptive-insular pathway, other functional
systems like the immunological and visceral, are contributing
to BA together with extero- and proprioceptive processing.
Altogether, this strongly emphasizes how BA is above all a
bottom-up ‘bodily’ aﬀair, in line with emotional theories of
James-Lange or Damasio. Although this could sound intuitively
right, it is only due to rigorous research on processes such as
BA that the cognitive hegemony of the previous decade has
been corrected in favor of ‘sub-cortical processing’ (Payne et al.,
2015) and this has substantial consequences for therapy as will be
explained further on. Finally, a detailed analysis of BA-pathways
gives a preliminary explanation for clinical observations or
psychological and phenomenological concepts –such as the
body as source of tacit knowledge– that are common among
bodyworkers and psychotherapists, as will be elucidated.
Myofascial Tissue and BA
Based on this detailed description of BA-pathways and aiming
at a therapeutic transfer in the end, we are urged to look again
at the deﬁnition of BA where Fogel (2009) highlighted the
online registration of what is experienced without mediation by
cognitive processes, while Mehling et al. (2011, 2009) stresses
that BA is in particular about a conscious processing of the re-
representation of all bodily arousal arriving at the insula. To this
extent BA can be understood as the phenomenon emerging at the
level of the anterior insula referring at the diﬀerent authors who
theorize the posterior to anterior insular gradient as a shift in
becoming self-aware. However, as this article intended to focus
on possible clinical implications it should be reminded that the
diﬃculty or even inability of alexithymic patients suﬀering from
MUS lies especially in registering, exploring and ﬁnally putting
into words what they experience on a bodily emotional level. It is
in particular at this point that the added ‘hands-on’ value of EBW
can come into play as its primary entry-point –the myofascial
tissue– oﬀers a unique gateway to the interoceptive brain-body
pathways.
However, this uniqueness is twofold in that sense that it
is situated on a more etiological as well as a therapeutic
level. As extensively described, the interoceptive-insular pathway
consists of ‘whole body’ sensory input, which includes every
myofascial tissue structure. Indeed, several studies (Stecco et al.,
2007; Benjamin, 2009) not only show how myofascial tissue
is richly innervated by unmyelinated poly-modal C-ﬁbers –
by Schleip (2003a,b) labeled as interstitial myofascial tissue
receptors (IMTR)– but they also indicate how these IMTR
react to a speciﬁc manual approach, described as tangential or
slow melting pressure. Moreover, the myoﬁbroblasts, which are
abundantly present in myofascial tissue, are driven by IMTR
and are found capable to generate a so called fascial pretension
(Schleip, 2003a,b; Langevin and Huijing, 2009; Abu-Hijleh et al.,
2012; Oschman, 2012; Levin and Martin, 2012; Schleip and
Jäger, 2012). Although this tensional force of fascia can operate
autonomously from muscle tone (Schleip et al., 2005, 2012;
Masi and Hannon, 2008; Schleip, 2011), it is thought that in
endured conditions it can lead up to a fascial stiﬀness due
to its sensitivity for over-activation of the autonomic nervous
system or stress (Liptan, 2010; Donadio et al., 2012). Key
link in the transmission between sympathetic over-tuning and
myoﬁbroblast proliferation resulting in myofascial tissue stiﬀness
seems to be TGF-béta 1 (transforming growth factor). In addition
to this more fascia-related inﬂuence of stress, it is also known
that muscle load per se is perceived as interoceptive input based
on contractile as well as metabolic tissue sensitivity. This is why
Craig (2002) speaks of a continuous drive of a variety of regional
and whole-body adjustments to muscular work being processed
as interoception. In addition speciﬁc receptors –called human
tactile C-ﬁbers– are identiﬁed as tuning the interoceptive-insular
pathway when responding to ‘light sensual touch’ (Olausson et al.,
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2002, 2008, 2010; Björnsdotter et al., 2010; Ackerley et al., 2014;
McGlone et al., 2014). Furthermore, this synopsis is consistent
with research showing how insular activity is linked with human
touch and attachment (Taylor et al., 2000; Bartels and Zeki, 2004;
Field et al., 2009; Lovero et al., 2009; Field, 2010; Herbert and
Pollatos, 2012).
On a more clinical level a lot of this research echoes what
Reich (1972, 1973) saw from a empirical-intuitive basis in
his patients as an armoring of the body which he deﬁned as
the experience-dependent development of a protective shell of
muscle tension grown over time in response to a history of threat,
anxiety and trauma. To this muscular armor he (Reich, 1973)
attributed characteristics such as it stiﬀens the coordination of
the segments of the body, reduces the postural repertoire, inhibits
respiration, and diminishes the perception of what goes on in
the body, which are very recognizable in MUS. This idea of the
body as a blueprint or expression of personal experiencing and
psychodynamic coping is also more and more supported from
neuro-developmental as well as psychological perspectives. In
that sense, neuromuscular and autonomic nervous systems are
thought to encode patterns of early object relations, so that there
may be a long term autobiographical memory of a pathological
internal object relation, that becomes the unconscious working
model (Schore, 2001). In addition it is stressed that attachment
which is basically described as mental pattern, is also held
in place by chronic physical tendencies reﬂective of early
attachment pattern (Ogden et al., 2006). Taken together, it could
be summarized that the whole myofascial substrate including
muscle, fascia and skin –as detailed in this section– is referring
at the concept of our patients armored body and should be seen
as a interoceptive generator, if approached in the proper manual
way.
Why is Interoception so Paramount?
By now we know that (a) the whole skin and myofascial
tissue functions as an interoceptive sensitive substrate if
approached properly, (b) the interoceptive-insular pathway is
deeply connected with our autonomic and emotional brain areas
together with the neuro-anatomical correlates of verbal and
non-verbal memory storage and (c) this interoceptive-insular
pathway not only serves as the substrate for the emergence of
BA but is also credited as crucial in normal or psychosomatic
functioning. Herewith a theoretical basis is oﬀered for what in
EBW is often referred to as a ‘listening touch’ (Fogel, 2009), a
‘limbic touch’ (Olausson et al., 2002; Van der Kolk, 2014) or
a ‘medium for haptic perception’ (Turvey and Fonseca, 2014).
If earlier BA was described as the quintessence of EBW, a
threefold logic constitutes its keystone and can be synthesized
as follows: (1) interoception is crucial in psychosomatic disorder
and somatization, (2) the interoceptive-insular pathway is the
central correlate of what phenomenologically is called BA and (3)
myofascial tissue is not only our largest interoceptive organ but
can react in a dysfunctional or even pathological way to endured
stress as in a loaded emotional context or trauma.
So leaving the mere neuroanatomical analysis and resuming
a clinical and therapy oriented stance, BA can now be seen as
a privileged entry-point to psychosomatics in general and MUS
speciﬁcally. Reminding now how alexithymia links with MUS
brings up the question if BA as a therapeutic goal in EBW can
oﬀer the hypothesized added value. Here a further diﬀerentiation
of BA, conceptualized by Fogel (2009, 2011), oﬀers a possible
step stone in ﬁne-tuning how a speciﬁc manual approach helps
alexithymic people (re-)contacting and exploring their inner-
world. Fogel (2009, 2011) uses the term ‘embodied self-awareness’
to describe the ability to be in the subjective emotional present
and to explore the intricacies of senses,movements, and emotions
in relation to others and the world. Hereby, embodied self-
awareness is labeled as spontaneous, creative, and open to change,
concrete and lived in the present moment and most of all
characterized by its non-verbal, trans-lingual nature.
All of these features are congruent with the pre-reﬂective and
non-verbal nature of BA as a tacit but experiential primordial
contact with the world. Besides the embodied outward relation
to the world, there is also an inward relation that has been
extensively analyzed and paraphrased as the body being a source
of knowledge or wisdom (Wilde, 2003; Fuchs and Schlimme,
2009; Stanghellini, 2009; Gyllensten et al., 2010). Here the
individual who listens and tunes in to his body can learn
and experience an inner approval or meaning bestowing which
is sometimes labeled as a felt sense (Gendlin, 1969; Gendlin
and Olsen, 1970). From a phenomenological perspective, it has
been studied why in particular this ability of BA as tuning-
in and feeling the self as an embodied intelligence, is often
not available in people with chronic illness or pain (Price,
1993; Bullington, 2009; Calsius et al., 2015). When Fogel (2009)
states that embodied self-awareness does not require language
for its expression and exists prior to language, he is referring
at the developmental processing of its key neurobiological
correlate, namely the amygdala. In line with Craig, Fogel sees
the interoceptive-insular pathway as the backbone of BA but
although equally stressing the exclusive interest of the insular
capacity to re-representation, he links the lower and limbic brain
structures to embodied self-awareness. A profound therapeutic
consequence of this is the use of evocative language (Fogel,
2009) or imagery playing-out (Payne and Crane-Godreau, 2015;
Payne et al., 2015) to enter, explore and express embodied self-
awareness in patients. In contrast to regular language that is
more under cognitive control and censorship, evocative language
and imagery are resonating the felt experience ‘as it appears in
the present moment’ (Gendlin, 1969; Gendlin and Olsen, 1970;
Bloom, 2006; Fogel, 2009). Besides spontaneous words that are
capturing this resonance or felt sense also metaphors, images,
dreams, poetry, music, drama, or meditation are examples and
from a more psychoanalytical angle, free association is evocative
language alike.
As described earlier, it is precisely this ability to embodied self-
awareness that is lacking in alexithymic people and makes them
vulnerable to psychosomatic dysfunction as a wordless gap lies
between the level of bodily arousal and the transfer into language
or imagination. So working with embodied self-awareness in
therapy could be meaningful as EBW is speciﬁcally aiming at
closing this gap. Herewith we are arriving at the central question
of this article on how a manual, touch-based approach can be a
unique entry-point.
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Touching the Body, Moving the Words
When Vanheule et al. (2011b) approach alexithymia from a
psychoanalytical perspective they describe it as a representational
failure of bodily arousal and tension when people do not
understand what is going on in their body while experiencing
for example stress or trivial somatic signals. Subsequently they
point at the importance of the progressive and patient-ﬁt process
of ﬁnding words to describe the sensations and feelings, i.e.,
symbolisation. At the same time they stress that “treatment should
not focus on the mental representational deficit as such, but on
the underlying experiences, with which the patient fails to deal
mentally” (Vanheule et al., 2011b, p. 91). As psychotherapists they
propose a three-step logic wherein the un-mentalized experiences
are facilitated into an autobiographical narrative. Although a
psychoanalytic approach would intuitively not seem to aim at
the same therapeutic goals, there appears to be quite some
resemblance with therapies in EBW.
Given the use of a ‘listening,’ ‘haptic,’ or ‘limbic’ touch
EBW not only helps the patient tuning into the interoceptive-
insular pathway and rebalancing the window of tolerance to
an optimal arousal zone –mostly by silencing the sympathetic
overdrive– but speciﬁcally facilitates the ability to become
body aware and to contact one’s own bodily inner world. In
short, EBW creates an optimal momentum for embodied self-
awareness and invites or even provokes evocative language. In
particular, the limbic load of the interoceptive-insular pathway
is hypothesized to aﬀect the experiential BA-process during the
hands-on approach. The combination of light and tactile manual
bodywork with non-directive verbal guidance is triggering the
dyadic bodily resonance described by several authors as being
deeply healing, restoring and resourcing (Totton, 1998, 2005;
Levine, 2005; Bloom, 2006; Ogden et al., 2006; White, 2006;
Heller, 2012; Cipolletta, 2013; Van der Kolk, 2014; Cornell, 2015;
Payne et al., 2015). Trying to grasp the underlying mechanism
of this beneﬁcial process of EBW, research mostly points at
optimizing and rebalancing of a secure attachment (Ogden
et al., 2006), at opening up the social engagement system
(Porges, 2009), at engaging and integrating preverbal memories
(Bloom, 2006), at befriending the body, which is a metaphor
for allowing and naming the physical sensations beneath the
emotions (Van der Kolk, 2014) or at biological completion
(Payne and Crane-Godreau, 2015; Payne et al., 2015). The latter
authors are putting forward a hypothesis for understanding body
mind therapies as normalizing what they call a preparatory
set, which is basically a unitary trauma response based on
aﬀect, posture and muscle tone, autonomic state, attention, and
expectation and which they call the core response network.
Although all of these authors are to some extent drawing on
neurophysiological frameworks, they ultimately point at the
quintessence of becoming self-aware from within the body,
which is convergent with the realm of phenomenological BA-
psychotherapies and EBW. Wilde (2003) rephrases this more
explicitly focussing on the experiential level and using BA to
enter the lived body as contacting ‘a silent partner of informant
of embodied knowledge.’ Interestingly, Payne et al. (2015) point
at the same two principal ways how what they name as body-
mind therapeutic or educational systems can work, by becoming
aware and by biological completion such as trembling, crying
or ﬂushing in which the originally obstructed load is enabled to
complete itself.
As proposed in this present article, in EBW these two
principals are intertwined ﬁrstly because the listening touch in
EBW –whether hands on body work is combined with verbal
exploration at the same time or more in a phased protocol–
is oﬀering a concrete way-in to the patients inner world of
sensations and emotions while serving as a tangible support for
BA. In particular for alexithymic patients, this guidance can be
of signiﬁcance regarding their representational failure of bodily
arousal and tension. Secondly, given the limbic load of touch
in EBW, the therapeutic frame is now expanded with an inside-
out bodily experience of a safe, attentive and authentic presence,
crucial for holding and containment. Although not required,
this can facilitate a cathartic process –comparable with Payne’s
idea of biological completion and Reichs earlier thoughts on
a break-through– where the patient is guided in expressing or
acting-out in a more evocative or bodily language what we
earlier called un-mentalized material. This seeking for words
of symbolization puts the patient (back) at the perspectival
origin of his experiences, behavior, and thoughts so he can
learn once again to trust his body as a source of information
and knowledge and create the necessary counter-weight to
correct his often hyper-cognitive ways of coping with stressful
situations.
CONCLUSION
Body awareness as the ability to contact and feel one’s body from
within is considered a key feature in normal functioning and
general health. On the other hand alexithymia weighs on the
etiology of psychosomatic processing and MUS in particular. In
that way, working with the inability to mentalize bodily arousal,
tension, and inner feelings together with its representational
failure has a pivotal role in therapy with MUS-patients. Given
the often disappointing outcomes of verbal psychotherapies as
well as somatic therapies, this article reﬂected on how hands-on
bodywork inﬂuences BA, helps patients to mentalize and express
what they experience and legitimizes a more body integrated
psychotherapeutic approach of MUS.
First of all interoception was detailed as paramount for
understanding the phenomenology of BA and grounding its
possible therapeutic implementations. Intertwined with the
neurophysiological pathways of interoception, the interstitial
myofascial tissue receptors and human tactile C-ﬁbers are
thought to explain –at least partially– how touch can play a
unique role in therapy other than its most known extero- and
proprioceptive functioning. Key elements here are that (a) the
whole skin and myofascial tissue serves as an interoceptive
sensitive substrate if approached properly, (b) the interoceptive-
insular pathway is deeply connected with our autonomic and
emotional brain areas together with the neuro-anatomical
correlates of verbal and non-verbal memory, and (c) this
interoceptive-insular pathway not only constitutes the substrate
for the emergence of BA but is also credited as crucial in normal
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or psychosomatic functioning. Hereby the body moves from its
previous peripheral and secondary position in psychotherapy to a
more central spot whereby research has shown how a continuous
drive of regional and whole-body adjustments to muscular
‘myofascial’ bodywork is being processed as interoception. In
short, the (myofascial) body cannot be seen anymore as solely a
passive ‘thing’ that only reacts on psycho-emotional load but is
an interactive and instructive ‘agens’ that tunes feelings, thoughts,
and the lived body in general.
Subsequently not only verbal BA interventions can be seen as
a privileged entry-point to this interoceptive realm but especially
the use of ‘haptic’ or ‘listening’ touch can oﬀer patients with
MUS a concrete way-in to their inner world of experiencing while
serving as a tangible support. It puts these patients once again
at the perspectival origin of their experiences and helps to trust
their body as a source of tacit knowledge and counter-weight
on the often hyper-cognitive ways of coping with stress. Co-
using evocative language and movement to explore and express
their inner realms, helps bypassing the alexithymic gap of these
patients and makes the embodied self-awareness resonate ‘as it
appears in the present moment.’
From a trans-disciplinary angle this article contributed to
a more sound understanding of experiential bodywork as an
added value in psychotherapy inMUS. Although further research
and clinical outcome studies are essential to legitimize this
intriguing relationship between bodywork and psychotherapy, a
compelling amount of state of the art research seems to conﬁrm
what intuitively and empirically is known since the hay-days of
psychotherapy: the body cannot be left out when entering and
treating the psychosomatic circle.
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